标签: 优先注册原则

  • 土地所有权优先原则:早先注册的所有权优于后续所有权

    本案确立了一项重要原则:在多方就同一地块主张所有权时,早先注册的所有权优先于后续注册的所有权。这意味着,即使后续的所有权人对该土地进行了改善或开发,也不能推翻原所有权人的权利。该判决强调了土地注册制度的稳定性和可预见性,保护了土地所有权人的合法权益。

    土地争端:国家住房管理局与劳里托家族的较量

    本案涉及国家住房管理局(NHA)与劳里托家族之间对位于甲米地省卡莫纳的一块土地的所有权争议。劳里托家族声称,他们的父母是该土地的注册所有者,拥有在1956年注册的所有权证书。而NHA则主张,他们通过一系列转让获得了该土地的所有权,但这些转让的时间晚于劳里托家族的注册时间。

    法院在审理本案时发现,NHA的所有权主张来源于一项管理上的重建所有权,而劳里托家族的所有权证书是在此之前注册的。根据菲律宾的土地注册制度,早先注册的所有权具有优先效力。法院还认为,NHA未能充分证明其作为善意购买者的地位,因为在购买该土地时,存在一些明显的迹象表明该土地的所有权存在问题。NHA未能尽到合理的注意义务,因此不能享有善意购买者的保护。

    在本案中,NHA主张,他们是从注册所有者那里购买的土地,因此没有义务对之前的转让进行进一步调查。然而,法院驳回了这一观点,认为NHA作为政府机构,应该比普通个人更加谨慎地处理土地交易。法院指出,NHA未能充分调查该土地的所有权历史,也没有对之前所有权的合法性进行核实。因此,NHA不能声称自己是善意购买者。

    本案还涉及第三方的干预,他们声称自己是原始所有者的继承人,并且对该土地拥有所有权。然而,法院驳回了他们的干预请求,理由是他们的请求是在案件审理的后期提出的,而且他们未能充分证明自己与该土地的联系。根据菲律宾的诉讼规则,干预请求必须在法院作出判决之前提出。

    本案的判决结果是,法院确认劳里托家族对该土地的所有权,并宣布NHA的所有权证书无效。法院还命令NHA从该土地上搬离,并将土地的占有权交还给劳里托家族。此外,法院还命令NHA向劳里托家族支付土地价值的赔偿金,以及自1991年起计算的利息。

    本案的判决强调了土地注册制度的重要性,以及善意购买者的保护原则。善意购买者是指在购买土地时,没有意识到该土地的所有权存在问题的购买者。善意购买者可以受到法律的保护,即使他们购买的土地的所有权存在瑕疵。然而,如果购买者在购买土地时,已经意识到该土地的所有权存在问题,或者应该意识到该土地的所有权存在问题,则不能被视为善意购买者。

    总而言之,最高法院在本案中强调了对注册土地所有权的尊重,并坚持了“先注册原则”。同时,最高法院也强调,购买者在购买土地时,有义务尽到合理的注意义务,以确保自己购买的土地的所有权是清晰和有效的。本案的判决对于维护土地市场的稳定和保护土地所有权人的合法权益具有重要意义。

    FAQs

    本案的关键问题是什么? 本案的关键问题是,在对同一块土地拥有多个所有权证书的情况下,哪一个证书具有优先效力。法院裁定,早先注册的证书具有优先效力。
    什么是善意购买者? 善意购买者是指在不知情的情况下,购买了所有权存在瑕疵的财产的人。在某些情况下,善意购买者可以受到法律的保护。
    法院为何驳回第三方的干预请求? 法院驳回第三方的干预请求,是因为他们的请求是在案件审理的后期提出的,而且他们未能充分证明自己与该土地的联系。
    本案对土地所有权人有何影响? 本案的判决强调了土地注册制度的重要性,并保护了土地所有权人的合法权益。
    本案对土地购买者有何影响? 本案的判决提醒土地购买者,在购买土地时,有义务尽到合理的注意义务,以确保自己购买的土地的所有权是清晰和有效的。
    “先注册原则”在本案中如何适用? 法院依据“先注册原则”,确认劳里托家族的土地所有权优先于国家住房管理局的后续权利主张,因为劳里托家族的所有权证书注册时间更早。
    行政重建的所有权证书与原始所有权证书相比,权重如何? 即使后续进行了行政重建,原始注册的所有权证书仍然优于重建证书,只要原始注册在先,并且重建过程没有明确的合法性。
    如果国家住房管理局无法交还土地,会发生什么? 如果国家住房管理局无法实际交还土地,他们将被命令向劳里托家族支付土地的市场价值作为赔偿,并附带利息。

    总之,该判决维护了菲律宾的土地所有权登记制度,确认了最先登记的权利的优先地位。它还提醒各方注意,购买土地不仅仅是登记的问题,还需要进行充分的调查。若要了解该判决对具体情况的应用,请通过contact或发送电子邮件至frontdesk@asglawpartners.com与ASG律师事务所联系。

    如需咨询此裁决对特定情况的适用,请通过contact 或发送电子邮件至frontdesk@asglawpartners.com与ASG律师事务所联系。

    免责声明:本分析仅供参考,不构成法律建议。对于针对您的情况的特定法律指导,请咨询合格的律师。
    资料来源:最高法院案件,G.R. No. 191657, 2017年7月31日

  • 企业名称权:相似名称的混淆性与保护

    最高法院裁定,企业不得使用与现有公司名称具有欺骗性或混淆性相似的名称。本裁决明确了公司名称的专有使用权,强调了在企业注册时避免混淆的重要性。对于企业而言,这意味着必须进行彻底的名称搜索,以确保拟议的名称不会侵犯现有公司的权利,否则可能面临法律诉讼,被迫更改名称。

    企业名称之争:GSIS与BPI谁的“家庭”更正宗?

    本案涉及GSIS家庭银行(前身为Comsavings银行)和BPI家庭银行之间关于使用“家庭”一词作为其公司名称一部分的争议。BPI家庭银行声称对“家庭银行”这一名称拥有专有权,理由是其通过与家庭银行和信托公司合并而获得,并且多年来已在该名称下获得了良好的声誉。GSIS家庭银行,则认为“家庭”一词是通用术语,不应被任何一家银行独占。

    案件的核心问题是,GSIS家庭银行使用“家庭”一词是否会对公众造成混淆,使他们误认为两家银行之间存在关联。根据菲律宾公司法第18条的规定,如果拟议的名称与任何现有公司的名称相同,或具有欺骗性或混淆性相似,或具有明显的欺骗性,混淆性或违反现有法律,则证券交易委员会(SEC)不得允许使用该名称。最高法院在审查了案件的背景后,认为BPI家庭银行拥有对“家庭银行”名称的优先使用权。

    最高法院的判决基于以下几个关键要素。首先,BPI家庭银行早在1969年就以家庭储蓄银行的名义注册,并在1985年通过合并获得了对“家庭银行”名称的权利。GSIS家庭银行则在2002年才开始使用该名称,晚于BPI家庭银行。优先注册原则是决定此类案件的关键,因为根据法律格言“先来后到”,BPI家庭银行对该名称拥有优先权。法院认为,BPI家庭银行对“家庭银行”一词的使用比GSIS家庭银行早得多,因此拥有了合法的专有使用权。

    其次,最高法院认为GSIS家庭银行的公司名称与BPI家庭银行的公司名称具有混淆性相似。法院指出,即使没有实际混淆的证据,只要存在混淆的可能性就足够了。法院认为,由于两家银行都从事银行业务,公众可能会误认为两家银行之间存在关联或合作关系。虽然GSIS家庭银行在名称中加入了“GSIS”和“thrift”等词语,但法院认为这些词语不足以区分两家银行的名称,因为“GSIS”只是政府服务保险系统的首字母缩写,而“thrift”只是对银行类型的描述。重要的是,法院认为这些补充词汇并不能有效消除公众的混淆,尤其是在银行业这样一个对信任和声誉要求极高的行业。

    最高法院还驳回了GSIS家庭银行关于“家庭”一词是通用名称的说法。法院认为,“家庭”一词与银行业务没有直接联系,因此不能被视为通用名称。相反,“家庭银行”一词是一种暗示性的说法,表明该银行是家庭储蓄的理想场所。暗示性商标不需要直接描述产品或服务,而是暗示其某种特性或优点。由于BPI家庭银行长期以来一直在使用该名称并建立了良好的声誉,因此法院认为该名称已获得了显著的识别性,并应受到保护。同时最高法院也指出,商标权的保护并非绝对,它需要建立在使用在先和避免造成市场混淆的基础上。

    GSIS家庭银行辩称,菲律宾中央银行(BSP)和贸易和工业部(DTI)批准其使用“GSIS家庭银行”作为公司名称,这应被视为授权。然而,最高法院驳回了这一论点,理由是SEC对所有公司拥有绝对的管辖权、监督和控制权。即使BSP和DTI批准了GSIS家庭银行的名称,SEC仍然有权决定该名称是否与现有公司名称具有混淆性相似。公司名称的最终裁决权在于SEC,其他政府机构的批准不能取代SEC的权力。

    最终,法院认为,公司法第18条的目的是防止公司名称的混淆,以保护相关公司和公众的利益。SEC在行使其法定职责时,可以随时注销其认为可能引起混淆的公司名称。由于BPI家庭银行对“家庭银行”一词拥有优先权,并且GSIS家庭银行的公司名称具有混淆性相似,因此最高法院支持SEC的决定,命令GSIS家庭银行停止使用“家庭”一词作为其公司名称的一部分。

    FAQs

    本案的关键问题是什么? 本案的关键问题是,GSIS家庭银行使用“家庭”一词作为公司名称的一部分是否与BPI家庭银行的名称具有混淆性相似,以及BPI家庭银行是否对“家庭银行”一词拥有专有使用权。
    法院如何裁定公司名称的相似性? 法院裁定公司名称的相似性基于是否可能误导一个使用普通注意力和辨别力的人。即使没有实际混淆的证据,只要存在混淆的可能性就足够了。
    什么是优先注册原则? 优先注册原则是指在多个公司都声称对同一名称拥有权利的情况下,法院通常会支持最早注册该名称的公司。
    本案对企业有什么实际影响? 本案对企业的实际影响是,在选择公司名称时必须进行彻底的名称搜索,以确保拟议的名称不会侵犯现有公司的权利。
    什么是通用名称? 通用名称是指一种商品或服务的通用名称或描述,例如“lite”用于啤酒。通用名称通常不能被任何一家公司独占。
    SEC在公司名称方面的权力是什么? SEC对所有公司拥有绝对的管辖权、监督和控制权,并且有权决定公司名称是否与现有公司名称具有混淆性相似。
    暗示性商标是什么? 暗示性商标是指暗示一种商品或服务的某种特性或优点的商标,例如“家庭银行”暗示该银行是家庭储蓄的理想场所。
    BSP或DTI的批准是否意味着公司可以合法使用某个名称? 不,即使BSP或DTI批准了公司使用某个名称,SEC仍然有权决定该名称是否与现有公司名称具有混淆性相似。

    总之,GSIS家庭银行一案强调了在选择公司名称时避免混淆的重要性。公司应进行彻底的名称搜索,以确保拟议的名称不会侵犯现有公司的权利。此外,公司应注意,即使其他政府机构批准了其名称,SEC仍然有权决定该名称是否合法。 这一判决强调了企业在品牌保护方面应采取积极措施,确保其品牌标识的独特性和合法性。

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: GSIS FAMILY BANK – THRIFT BANK VS. BPI FAMILY BANK, G.R. No. 175278, September 23, 2015

  • 公司名称纠纷:如何避免混淆和侵权风险

    本案确立了在公司名称争议中,先前注册的公司有权阻止其他公司使用与其名称相似并可能导致公众混淆的名称。这意味着公司在选择名称时,必须进行充分的调研,确保所选名称不会侵犯其他公司的权利。工业耐火材料公司(IRCP)试图挑战耐火材料公司(RCP)对其公司名称“耐火材料”的使用权,但最高法院最终维持了证券交易委员会(SEC)和上诉法院的判决,要求IRCP更改其公司名称。本案强调了公司在选择名称时,应避免使用可能引起混淆或欺骗的名称,否则可能面临法律诉讼和经济损失。

    “耐火材料”之争:公司名称相似度引发的法律挑战

    耐火材料公司(RCP)早在1976年就已成立,并注册了公司名称。几年后,工业耐火材料公司(IRCP)也进入市场,并且使用了与其竞争对手非常相似的名称。RCP认为IRCP使用的公司名称与其高度相似,可能导致公众误认为两家公司是同一家公司,因此向证券交易委员会(SEC)提起诉讼,要求IRCP更改其公司名称。案件的核心问题是:IRCP使用的公司名称是否与RCP的名称过于相似,以至于会引起混淆,以及SEC是否有权管辖此类公司名称争议?

    在法庭上,IRCP辩称SEC对此案没有管辖权,并且RCP无权独占使用通用名称“耐火材料”。 然而,最高法院驳回了这些论点。法院指出,根据公司法第18条,SEC有权监管公司名称,以防止混淆和欺骗。公司法第18条明确禁止使用与现有公司名称相同或具有欺骗性或混淆性相似的名称。这一规定的目的是保护公众,避免因公司名称的相似而产生误导。

    SEC有义务防止公司名称使用上的混淆,这不仅是为了保护相关公司,更是为了保护公众的利益。

    法院进一步解释说,确定公司名称是否构成混淆性相似,需要考虑两个关键因素:一是原告公司是否对该名称享有优先使用权,二是拟议名称是否与现有公司名称相同或具有欺骗性或混淆性相似。在本案中,RCP于1976年注册成立,并在IRCP之前开始使用“耐火材料公司”这一名称,因此,它对“耐火材料”一词的使用享有优先权。法院还认为,IRCP的名称“工业耐火材料公司”与RCP的名称“耐火材料公司”非常相似,足以引起公众混淆。

    公司在选择名称时,务必注意避免使用与现有公司过于相似的名称。根据公司名称审批修订指南,公司名称不得与已在委员会注册的其他公司的名称相同、具有误导性或混淆性相似。如果拟议名称与已注册公司的名称相似,则拟议名称必须包含至少一个与已注册公司名称不同的独特词语。法院还援引了飞利浦出口公司诉上诉法院案,其中确立了判断公司名称是否侵权的两个要件:

    (1) 原告公司对公司名称的使用享有优先权;

    以及

    (2) 拟议名称:(a) 相同;或 (b) 具有欺骗性或混淆性相似;或 (c) 明显具有欺骗性、混淆性或违反现行法律。

    尽管“耐火材料”一词是一个通用术语,但RCP长期使用该名称,使其与该公司紧密相连。最高法院指出,允许其他公司照搬并注册现有且受保护的公司名称,将会损害公众利益,并鼓励不正当竞争。关于律师费的问题,最高法院认为判给RCP 50,000比索的律师费是合理且公平的。菲律宾民法典第2208条允许在索赔人被迫与第三方诉讼或承担费用以保护其公正和有效的索赔时,裁定支付此类费用。在本案中,IRCP拒绝更改其公司名称,迫使RCP提起诉讼以保护其公司名称,因此RCP有权获得律师费赔偿。

    FAQs

    本案的关键问题是什么? 本案涉及公司名称是否具有欺骗性或混淆性相似,以及SEC是否有权管辖此类争议。
    为什么法院判决IRCP更改其公司名称? 法院认为IRCP的名称与RCP的名称过于相似,可能导致公众混淆,并且RCP对“耐火材料”一词的使用享有优先权。
    SEC是否有权管辖公司名称争议? 是的,根据公司法,SEC有权监管公司名称,以防止混淆和欺骗。
    公司如何避免公司名称侵权? 公司在选择名称时,应进行充分的调研,确保所选名称不会与现有公司名称相同或具有欺骗性或混淆性相似。
    “耐火材料”是一个通用术语,为什么RCP可以独占使用? 虽然“耐火材料”是一个通用术语,但RCP长期使用该名称,使其与该公司紧密相连,因此享有优先使用权。
    飞利浦出口公司诉上诉法院案确立了什么原则? 该案确立了判断公司名称是否侵权的两个要件:一是原告公司对公司名称的使用享有优先权,二是拟议名称是否与现有公司名称相同或具有欺骗性或混淆性相似。
    法院判给RCP律师费的依据是什么? 菲律宾民法典允许在索赔人被迫与第三方诉讼或承担费用以保护其公正和有效的索赔时,裁定支付律师费。
    公司名称的选择对企业经营有什么影响? 公司名称是企业的重要品牌资产,选择一个独特且不易混淆的名称,有助于企业建立品牌形象,避免法律纠纷。

    公司名称的选择是一个重要的商业决策,需要谨慎考虑。本案的判决提醒我们,公司在选择名称时,必须进行充分的调研,避免侵犯其他公司的权利,否则可能会面临法律诉讼和经济损失。此外,公司还应了解SEC的相关规定,确保所选名称符合法律要求。

    关于本裁决在特定情况下如何应用,如有疑问,请通过联系或发送电子邮件至frontdesk@asglawpartners.com与ASG Law联系。

    免责声明:本分析仅供参考,不构成法律建议。 如需针对您的情况量身定制的特定法律指导,请咨询合格的律师。
    资料来源:工业耐火材料公司诉上诉法院案,G.R. No. 122174,2002年10月3日

  • 菲律宾房产双重销售:先注册者胜诉原则及买方尽职调查要点

    房产双重销售纠纷:菲律宾最高法院阐释优先所有权归属

    G.R. No. 125861, September 09, 1998

    356 Phil. 555

    SECOND DIVISION

    [ G.R. No. 125861, September 09, 1998 ]

    ROSITA G. TAN, EUSEBIO V. TAN, REMIGIO V. TAN, JR., EUFROSINA V. TAN, VIRGILIO V. TAN AND EDUARDO V. TAN, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND FERNANDO TAN KIAT, RESPONDENT.

    D E C I S I O N

    MARTINEZ, J.:

    This petition assails the Decision of public respondent Court of Appeals dated May 28, 1996[1] reversing the Order of the Manila Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, dated December 15, 1993,[2] dismissing the complaint for recovery of property filed by private respondent Fernando Tan Kiat against petitioners.

    The controversy centers on two (2) parcels of land (hereafter, subject properties) situated at 970 M.H. del Pilar Street, Malate, Manila previously owned by one Alejandro Tan Keh and which were then covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35656 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila.

    Private respondent, in his complaint filed on October 18, 1993,[3] claimed that he bought the subject properties from Mr. Tan Keh in 1954 for P98,065.35, built his house thereon, but was unable to effect immediate transfer of title in his favor in view of his foreign nationality at the time of the sale. Nonetheless, as an assurance in good faith of the sales agreement, Mr. Tan Keh turned over to private respondent the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 35656 and, in addition, executed a lease contract in favor of private respondent for a duration of forty (40) years. However, in 1958, Mr. Tan Keh sold the subject properties to Remigio Tan, his brother and father of petitioners, with the understanding that the subject properties are to be held in trust by Remigio for the benefit of private respondent and that Remigio would execute the proper documents of transfer in favor of private respondent should the latter at anytime demand recovery of the subject properties. TCT No. 35656 was thus cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. 53284 was issued in the name of Remigio. Another contract of lease was executed by Mr. Tan Keh and Remigio in favor of private respondent to further safeguard the latter’s interest on the subject properties, but private respondent never paid any rental and no demand whatsoever for the payment thereof had been made on him. Remigio was killed in 1968. At his wake, petitioners were reminded of private respondent’s ownership of the subject properties and they promised to transfer the subject properties to private respondent who by then had already acquired Filipino citizenship by naturalization. Petitioners, however, never made good their promise to convey the subject properties despite repeated demands by private respondent. In fact, petitioners had the subject properties fraudulently transferred to their names under TCT No. 117898. Thus, the filing of the complaint for recovery of property.

    On November 10, 1993, petitioners filed a Motion To Dismiss[4] the complaint, claiming that: (1) the complaint stated no cause of action; (2) the cause of action has long prescribed; (3) the cause of action has long been barred by a prior judgment; and, (4) the claim has been waived, abandoned and/or extinguished by laches and estoppel. An Opposition to Motion To Dismiss with Memorandum[5] was filed by private respondent on November 29, 1993. In turn, petitioners on December 1, 1993 filed their Memorandum of Authorities.[6]

    Thereafter, the trial court on December 15, 1993 issued an order dismissing private respondent’s complaint, acceding to all the grounds set forth by petitioners in their motion to dismiss. Dissatisfied, private respondent appealed to public respondent CA which set aside the dismissal and ordered the remand of the case for further proceedings. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent CA in its Resolution dated July 31, 1996.[7]

    Now before us via this petition for review, petitioners insist on the propriety of the trial court’s order of dismissal, and reiterate, by way of assignment of errors, the same grounds contained in their motion to dismiss, to wit:

    I.
    THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION.

    II.
    THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT’S CAUSE OF ACTION HAS PRESCRIBED.

    III.
    THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT’S CAUSE OF ACTION IS BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT.

    IV.
    THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT’S CLAIM HAS BEEN WAIVED, ABANDONED OR OTHERWISE EXTINGUISHED.

    There is merit in the petition.

    There are three (3) reasons which warrant the reversal of the assailed decision of respondent court.

    Respondent court’s reading of the complaint is that it stated a cause of action, saying that:

    “x x x x x x x x x

    “The legal right of the appellant as stated in his complaint, is his right to demand transfer of title to him the property which is held in trust for him by the appellees. The correlative obligation of the appellees, on the other hand, is to deliver title over the property to the appellant which they are holding in trust for the former, upon the termination of the trust relationship, that is, when the appellant finally demanded that the title of the property be transferred in his name. The act or omission on the part of the appellees which constitutes the violation of the appellant’s right to secure title to the properties he owns and possesses, is their refusal to transfer the title of the property in the appellant’s name. All these averments the appellees hypothetically admit when they filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a cause of action. The trial court could have rendered a valid judgment upon these hypothetically admitted averments in accordance with the prayer in the complaint which is to have the title to the property held in trust by the appellee transferred in the appellant’s name.”

    The flaw in this conclusion is that, while conveniently echoing the general rule that averments in the complaint are deemed hypothetically admitted upon the filing of a motion to dismiss grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, it did not take into account the equally established limitations to such rule, i.e., that a motion to dismiss does not admit the truth of mere epithets of fraud; nor allegations of legal conclusions; nor an erroneous statement of law; nor mere inferences or conclusions from facts not stated; nor mere conclusions of law; nor allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject to judicial notice; nor matters of evidence; nor surplusage and irrelevant matter; nor scandalous matter inserted merely to insert the opposing party; nor to legally impossible facts; nor to facts which appear unfounded by a record incorporated in the pleading, or by a document referred to; and, nor to general averments contradicted by more specific averments.[8] A more judicious resolution of a motion to dismiss, therefore, necessitates that the court be not restricted to the consideration of the facts alleged in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Courts may consider other facts within the range of judicial notice as well as relevant laws and jurisprudence which the courts are bound to take into account,[9] and they are also fairly entitled to examine records/documents duly incorporated into the complaint by the pleader himself in ruling on the demurrer to the complaint.[10]

    Guided by these crucial limitations on hypothetical admissions, the “trust theory” being espoused by private respondent in his complaint, and upon which his claim over the subject properties is principally anchored, cannot hold water for the following reasons:

    First: The execution of a lease contract between Remigio Tan as lessor and private respondent as lessee over the subject properties, the existence of which is established not only by a copy thereof attached to petitioners’ motion to dismiss as Annex “1”[11] but by private respondent’s own admission reflected in paragraph 6 of the complaint, already belies private respondent’s claim of ownership. This is so because Article 1436 of the Civil Code,[12] Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court[13] and settled jurisprudence[14] consistently instruct that a lessee is estopped or prevented from disputing the title of his landlord.

    Second: In the Memorandum of Encumbrances found at the back of TCT No. 53284 issued in the name of Remigio Tan in 1958 attached as Annex “B”[15] to the complaint, there appears a mortgage constituted by Remigio Tan over the subject properties in favor of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank in 1963 to guarantee a principal obligation in the sum of P245,000.00. Remigio could not have mortgaged the subject properties had he not been the true owner thereof, inasmuch as under Article 2085 of the New Civil Code, one of the essential requisites for the validity of a mortgage contract is that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged. There is thus no denying that Remigio Tan’s successful acquisition of a transfer certificate of title (TCT No. 53284) over the subject properties in his name after having his brother’s (Alejandro Tan Keh) title thereto cancelled, and execution of a mortgage over the same properties in favor of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, undoubtedly, are acts of strict dominion which are anathema to the concept of a continuing and subsisting trust[16] private respondent relies upon.

    Third: There being no trust, express or implied, established in favor of private respondent, the only transaction that can be gleaned from the allegations in the complaint is a double sale, the controlling provision for which is Article 1544 of the Civil Code, to wit:

    “Article 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.

    “Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

    “Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.”

    Private respondent alleged that he bought the subject properties from Alejandro Tan Keh in 1954 but nonetheless failed to present any document evidencing the same, while Remigio Tan, as the other buyer, had in his name TCT No. 53284 duly registered in the Registry of Deeds of Manila on October 13, 1958.[17] Remigio Tan, beyond doubt, was the buyer entitled to the subject properties since the prevailing rule is that in the double sale of real property, the buyer who is in possession of a Torrens title and had the deed of sale registered must prevail.[18]

    Fourth: Petitioners are in possession of TCT No. 117898 which evidences their ownership of the subject properties. On the other hand, private respondent relies simply on the allegation that he is entitled to the properties by virtue of a sale between him and Alejandro Tan Keh who is now dead. Obviously, private respondent will rely on parol evidence which, under the circumstances obtaining, cannot be allowed without violating the “Dead Man’s Statute” found in Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz:

    “Sec. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. – Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.”

    The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard of the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party, and further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity to giving testimony. If one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction.[19]

    Clearly then, from a reading of the complaint itself, the annexes attached thereto and relevant laws and jurisprudence, the complaint indeed does not spell out any cause of action.

    We agree with the petitioners’ submission that private respondent’s cause of action has prescribed. TCT No. 53284 in the name of Remigio Tan was registered on October 13, 1958, while TCT No. 117898 in the name of his heirs, herein petitioners, was issued on April 21, 1975. Private respondent filed his complaint on October 18, 1993. Respondent court held that the ten (10)-year prescriptive period for the reconveyance of property based on an implied trust cannot apply in this case since private respondent was in actual possession of the subject properties, citing as authority the case of Heirs of Jose Olviga v. CA, et al.[20] Thus:

    “It is true that the prescriptive period within which to file an action for reconveyance of property based on an implied trust is 10 years from the date of issuance of a certificate of title thereon in accordance with Article 1144 of the New Civil Code and jurisprudence (see Heirs of Jose Olviga v. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 330 citing the case of Vda. de Portugal v. IAC, 159 SCRA 1780). But this rule applies only when the plaintiff (the appellant) is not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe (Heirs of Jose Olviga v. Court of Appeals, supra; underscoring supplied; see also Sapto v. Fabiana, 103 Phil. 683 and Faja v. Court of Appeals, 75 SCRA 441 cited in the decision).

    “The Court notes that, as alleged in the complaint, the appellant has been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the property in the concept of an owner since 1954; which allegation, by the appellees’ motion to dismiss, has been hypothetically admitted. Therefore, the appellant’s cause of action is, by jurisprudence, even imprescriptible.”

    Reliance on the Olviga case is misplaced. Private respondents in Olviga were actually occupying the subject land fraudulently registered in the name of Jose Olviga in a cadastral proceeding as owners. The rightful application of the doctrine highlighted in Olviga the right to seek reconveyance of property actually in possession of the plaintiffs is imprescriptible would only cover a situation where the possession is in the concept of an owner. This is bolstered not only by Article 1118 of the Civil Code, falling under the chapter Prescription of Ownership and other Real Rights, which provides that:

    “Article 1118. Possession has to be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted.” (emphasis ours),

    but by a further reading of Olviga which emphasized that “x x x if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe.”[21]

    In this case, however, private respondent’s occupation of the subject properties was never in the concept of an owner since he was a mere lessee who, as hereinbefore discussed, is estopped from denying the title of Remigio Tan as owner-lessor. At best, private respondent’s stay on the properties as lessee was by “license or by mere tolerance” which, under Article 1119 of the Civil Code, “shall not be available for the purposes of possession.”[22]

    It thus becomes evident that the filing of private respondent’s complaint in 1993 – thirty five (35) years after TCT No. 53284 in the name of Remigio Tan was registered and eighteen (18) years after the issuance of TCT No. 117898 in the names of petitioners – was way beyond the ten (10)-year time limit within which reconveyance of property based on an implied trust should be instituted. Private respondent’s cause of action, assuming that it exists, has clearly prescribed.

    Finally, private respondent is guilty of laches. In negating the onset of laches, respondent CA held:

    “But the presumption of abandonment in asserting a right or declining to do so does not apply to appellant. For the appellant has been and still is in actual, peaceful and continuous physical possession of the property. Being in actual, peaceful and continuous physical possession of the property cannot certainly be said as non-assertion of a right to the property. Moreover, the appellee had acknowledged the trust character of possession of the title, and the appellant must certainly be granted the right to trust in that express assurance. The very fact that the appellant asserts his rights vis-à-vis the appellees show that he has not abandoned to secure the title to a very substantial property located in the heart of Manila.”

    Private respondent’s possession of the subject properties cannot be made the basis to deflect the effects of laches because he is a mere lessee who, to repeat, cannot assert any adverse claim of ownership over the subject properties against the lessor-owner. What ought to be in focus is that, as alleged by private respondent in his complaint, he was not able to effect the transfer of title over the subject properties in his favor upon his purchase thereof from Alejandro Tan Keh in 1954 because he was still a foreigner at that time. But private respondent later on claimed that he was already a Filipino national when he reminded petitioners of his ownership of the subject properties during Remigio Tan’s wake sometime in 1968. It may be reasonably deduced from these allegations that private respondent acquired Filipino citizenship by naturalization, thus entitling him to own properties in the 1960’s, more or less. His mistake, if it is one, is that he tarried for thirty (30) years before formally laying claim to the subject properties before the court. Considerable delay in asserting one’s right before a court of justice is strongly persuasive of the lack of merit of his claim, since it is human nature for a person to enforce his right when the same is threatened or invaded. Thus, private respondent is estopped by laches from questioning the ownership of the subject properties.[23]

    WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated May 28, 1996 and its Resolution of July 31, 1996 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof, are hereby SET ASIDE, and a new one is rendered DISMISSING private respondent Fernando Tan Kiat’s complaint.

    SO ORDERED.

    Melo, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
    Regalado, J., (Chairman), on leave.


    [1] Rollo, pp. 35-57.

    [2] Records, pp. 94-106.

    [3] Records, pp. 1-5.

    [4] Records, pp. 20-35.

    [5] Records, pp. 52-66.

    [6] Records, pp. 67-93.

    [7] Rollo, pp. 59-61.

    [8] Alzua and Arnalot v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308; Vergel de Dios v. Bristol Laboratories, Inc., 55 SCRA 349; Mathay, et al. v. Consolidated Bank & Trust Co., et al., 58 SCRA 559; U. Bañez Electric Light Company v. Abra Electric Cooperative, Inc., et al., 119 SCRA 90; Tan v. Director of Forestry, et al., 125 SCRA 302.

    [9] U. Bañez Electric Light Company v. Abra Electric Cooperative, Inc., ibid.

    [10] Alzua and Arnalot v. Johnson, ibid.

    [11] Records, pp. 36-37.

    [12] Article 1436. A lessee or a bailee is estopped from asserting title to the thing leased or received, as against the lessor or bailor.

    [13] SEC. 2. Conclusive presumptions. – The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:

    x x x x x x x x x

    (b.) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.(3a)

    [14] Pascual v. Angeles, 4 Phil. 604; Alderete v. Amandoron, 46 Phil. 488; Lizada v. Omanan, 59 Phil. 547; Zobel v. Mercado, 108 Phil. 240.

    [15] Records, pp. 10-11. As per Resolution of this Court dated February 25, 1998 directing private respondent to submit clearer copies of TCT Nos. 35656, 53284 & 117898 attached to the complaint as Annexes “A”, “B” and “C” respectively, a more readable copy of TCT No. 53284 was furnished this Court, appearing on pp. 178-179 of the Rollo.

    [16] Carantes v. CA, et al., 76 SCRA 514.

    [17] Rollo, p. 178.

    [18] Santiago v. CA, et al., 247 SCRA 336.

    [19] RJ Francisco on Evidence, Third Ed., 1996, p. 133, citing McCarthy vs. Wallstone, 210 App. Div. 152, 205; Goni, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 222.

    [20] 227 SCRA 330.

    [21] 227 SCRA 330, 335.

    [22] Article 1119 reads: “Acts of possessory character executed in virtue of license or by mere tolerance of the owner shall not be available for the purposes of possession.”

    [23] Quinsay v. IAC, et al., 195 SCRA 268.



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